Showing posts with label global multistakeholder community. Show all posts
Showing posts with label global multistakeholder community. Show all posts

2016-09-16

Tweets and Post-hearing Notes re: Cruz Hearing on IANA Transition

For background see on Domain Mondo: 

 Selected tweets from the twittersphere and commentary by Domain Mondo:
Dysfunctional ICANN leadership (e.g., former CEO and Board of Directors) together with lack of transparency are among the core reasons ICANN is not trusted by some members of the global multistakeholder community.

 Yes, in the IANA Transition plan, governments get a limited increase in power, but post-transition all governments (including U.S.) are equal inside ICANN, i.e., it takes just 1 government to prevent GAC consensus advice. But, by virtue of ICANN's corporate domicile (California) and ICANN's election as an IRC §501(c)(3) non-profit, California and U.S. law will have precedence in most ICANN legal disputes (see, e.g., Domain Mondo's ICANN Litigation Status Update).

 Potential liability under U.S. antitrust law may be one of the most important, and powerful, accountability measures on post-transition ICANN.

 Preventing a "competing" internet root may be the most compelling reason to not delay the IANA transition despite misgivings about ICANN or the IANA transition plan.
feedback & comments via twitter @DomainMondo


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2016-07-16

ICANN, NTIA, IANA Transition, Fundamental Problems, the Macro View

"We live a very complex world but we want simple answers.  What we end up doing is take a micro view of a situation because we have a sense we can grasp the problem better that way.  A macro view is more challenging because it requires you to handle more uncertainty."--Micro/Macro View | ceri.msu.edu (http://www.ceri.msu.edu/chatter/micromacro-view/).*


Above video is from IGF-USA 2016, July 14, 2016, program notes here.
Keynote: Larry Strickling, NTIA, US Dept. of Commerce (text of prepared remarks here).
Moderator: Shane Tews
Panelists:
  • Steve DelBianco, Executive Director, NetChoice
  • Gordon Goldstein, Managing Director - Head of External Affairs, SilverLake
  • John Kneuer, President and Founder of JKC Consulting LLC and Sr. Partner, Fairfax Media
  • Kristian Stout, Associate Director for Innovation Policy at the International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE)
  • Berin Szoka, President, TechFreedom
  • Jonathan Zuck, President, ACT
The above video will likely soon be forgotten, though it really shouldn't be, which is one reason Domain Mondo is publishing this post. It provides a snapshot of the IANA stewardship transition, plan and process, at this point in time. Pay particular attention to the concerns raised by some of the panelists.

As has been noted before on Domain Mondo, there are fundamental problems in the IANA stewardship transition, both in process and in substance, including ICANN accountability WS1 mechanisms. Here are some of the pros and cons (depending upon your point of view), of the Obama administration's (NTIA) IANA stewardship transition of U.S. government oversight to ICANN, a California corporation:
  • Solves (or at least is intended to solve) the U.S. government's problems in the wake of the Snowden revelations, including global criticism of the perceived role of  the U.S. government in the operation of the internet, thereby pre-empting a UN (or ITU) multilateral solution that would give governments a leading role;
  • Fulfills the promise of the U.S. government in 1998 to "privatize" and transition the US government's "historic stewardship role of internet oversight" to the "global multistakeholder community;"
  • False Narrative: the Obama administration (NTIA) bumbled the IANA transition from the beginning (March 2014) in two critical aspects: (1) NTIA pre-empted consideration of ICANN alternatives by the global internet community, and instead, in top-down fashion designated only ICANN, a California corporation and current IANA functions contractor, as the sole convener of the IANA transition planning process, thereby, in effect, pre-ordaining the end result and declaring ICANN to be the representative body of the "global multistakeholder community" and successor to NTIA in its "stewardship role." Unfortunately, as most knowledgeable people recognize, ICANN is not today, and never has been, truly representative of the global multistakeholder community ("massive power imbalance" within ICANN, absence of full global participation, a "broken" GNSO (ICANN's main policy-making body), etc.,--see News Review: ICANN, China, IANA: ex-CEO Fadi Chehadé's Sad Legacy). As a result, the IANA transition is already being dismissed and attacked globally as a U.S. government scheme to retain power and control over the internet; and (2) NTIA failed to recognize the extent of ICANN dysfunction and how much ICANN is not trusted, even by ICANN's own stakeholders, who in a rare moment of unanimity, insisted on adding an accountability (WS1) component to the IANA transition planning process, months after the NTIA announcement in March, 2014;
  • Immunity and Liability: once ICANN is operating "naked" without any contract from the U.S. government, or other sovereign authority, and lacking any operational status by way of statute or international treaty, such as that granted to the United Nations and its agencies, ICANN will no longer have the benefit of certain legal defenses based on U.S. law, including government contractor immunity, and may be subject to legal claims and liabilities anywhere a claimant asserts, and court affirms, jurisdiction.
  • Antitrust: as acknowledged by NTIA's Larry Stickling in the video above, ICANN "has always been and will continue to be subject to antitrust laws" of the United States (DOJ, FTC, and private antitrust actions), but with the U.S. government contract expiring, ICANN, as an unregulated global monopoly after September 30, 2016, as well as some of its "contracted parties," namely, the gTLD registry operators (each of which are granted exclusive global monopolies by ICANN), may be more likely to face antitrust actions in the future, not only in the U.S., but elsewhere.
  • Untested, unproven: none of the ICANN accountability mechanisms developed by the "ICANN community" in WS1 have yet been implemented, tested and proven. If the accountability mechanisms prove to be ineffective, there may be nothing either the U.S. government or ICANN community can do, leaving the global multistakeholder community with a dysfunctional, unaccountable ICANN.
  • Critical issues left to Work Stream 2 (WS2): work involving ICANN's jurisdiction and other issues was deferred to a later phase by ICANN and its CCWG-Accountability. The outcomes of WS2 will not be known until 2017, long after the IANA transition is complete.
The above list is not exhaustive, and others, such as U.S. Senators Cruz, Lankford, and Lee, have raised concerns related to foreign governments and free speech. Nevertheless, there is now little doubt that the Obama administration fully intends to allow the IANA functions contract expire on September 30, 2016. Caveat Emptor.

*For a further look at a micro/macro view comparison, with due credit to the Michigan State University source (first link above) and also to Peter Marber (petermarber.com):

Micro View:
  • Based on recency (present moment) or historic time biases; often failing to recognize changes in the environment, ecosystem, trends or indicators, or other new, evolving factors. Everything is predicated on the present or past perspective, even if past experience may no longer be applicable ("past success is no guarantee of future results"), or past policies no longer work (every economic model, every HFT algorithm, eventually fails);
  • Assumes larger degree of certainty and predictability than warranted; humans like certainty and often assume certainty, discounting risks, which has its own consequences. What is the level of information required, needed or even efficiently obtainable, before taking action?
  • Assumes, or locks-in, only one way;
  • Primary emphasis on control and concentrated power;
  • Cautious relationships, some participants (stakeholders) count less than others;
  • Policy changes are reactive not proactive;
  • Views issues as separate and compartmentalized, to be dealt with separately.
Macro View:
  • Forward time bias; tries to anticipate and think longer term;
  • Assumes more uncertainty, ambiguity and unpredictability; there is never a perfect answer or solution;
  • Many ways forward (more than one right way) depending on how one wants to arrange and rearrange the parts;
  • Influence is spread widely among a range of players;
  • Partnerships abound between countries, states as well as non-state agencies and others, such as non-profits (NGOs), education, business, and other interests or stakeholders;
  • Policy is proactive, involving many players, and evolving to fit the circumstances;
  • View issues as interrelated, integrative and global.

feedback & comments via twitter @DomainMondo


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2016-03-13

News Review: ICANN, IANA Transition Plan, NTIA, and U.S. Congress

"... the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) today announces its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community ..."-- NTIA, March 14, 2014
DomainMondoShiningLight ©2013domainmondo.com All Rights Reserved
Domain Mondo's review of the past week--and a look ahead to the coming week--

ICANN55 in Marrakech concluded Thursday, March 10th, after the ICANN Board of Directors, a year behind schedule, finally transmitted to NTIA the IANA Stewardship Transition Plan developed in response to the NTIA announcement of March 2014. Read more on Domain Mondo here and here.

Don't believe the hype you may have read or heard from ICANN and NTIA, or their various sycophants. Not only are both touting false narratives in support of the Plan, but both are equally to blame for a flawed transition process which resulted in a plan that fails to address the fundamental, systemic, and structural problems of ICANN. Not only are Work Stream 1 accountability recommendations "untested, unproven, and yet to be implemented" but some fundamental issues were deferred such as ICANN's jurisdiction which will be addressed in work stream 2 (WS2). Will ICANN, a California corporation, be the first U.S. non-profit corporate inversion--not for tax benefits but for political expedience--reincorporating and relocating to Beijing or Geneva or Brussels in the future? No one knows. U.S. jurisdiction is not a fundamental bylaw. Jurisdiction could be changed to any other nation in the future, totalitarian or otherwise. Even the accountability of ICANN's AC/SOs (advisory committees and supporting organizations) to the wider global internet community was deferred to Work Stream 2, meaning these issues will be dealt with sometime in the future. When, if ever, domain name registrants and internet users, who are the core of the global multistakeholder community, might see real accountability from ICANN and its "ICANN community" is unknown, but don't hold your breath!

Remember, NTIA in its announcement of March 14, 2014, failed to even mention, much less require, improvements in ICANN's accountability to either the ICANN community or the global multistakeholder community (and there is a difference, although NTIA acts as if there isn't). It wasn't until ICANN's own "ICANN community" (mostly lobbyists and special interests) vociferously objected, that NTIA agreed and forced ICANN--the California corporation--to add ICANN's accountability to its own "ICANN community" as a necessary component of the IANA transition plan.

 Also, not all Chartering organizations actually approved the CCWG Accountability proposal, and of those that did, many have members who expressed concerns or reservations--for example, note one slide shown at an ICANN55 ccNSO session--

One View of the Strengths & Weaknesses of the CCWG Accountability WS1 Proposal
Nevertheless, it is what it is. And the truth is, there isn't, at present, a better option B available other than to maintain the status quo which is unacceptable to most other governments in the world. Will the Plan be approved and current U.S. government oversight end on September 30, 2016? Short answer: Yes, unless Republicans insist on deferral until after a new administration takes office in January, 2017. We may know more this week after the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee's Communications and Technology Subcommittee holds its IANA transition hearing on March 17th. Stay tuned.

 Of course, there is always the possibility that Congress--both Democrats and Republicans--realizes it is in the best interests of not only the American people, but also the global internet community, to insist upon the completion and implementation and subsequent evaluation of both Work Stream 1 (WS1) and Work Stream 2 (WS2) accountability mechanisms, and whether they are actually effective and working, and then decide whether ending U.S. oversight is appropriate and in the best interests of both the American people and the global internet community.

See also on Domain Mondo:

Most popular articles at DomainMondo.com this past week (# of pageviews Sun-Sat):
  1. ICANN a Steward? LOL! This Is How ICANN Wastes Registrants' Money
  2. Forty Tech Companies Have Come to Apple's Encryption Defense (videos)
  3. News Review: ICANN55, IANA Transition, New gTLDs, dot AFRICA
  4. ICANN55: IANA Transition Plan, Sexual Harrassment, ICANN New gTLDs
  5. Could The CIA Have Stopped The 9/11 Hijackers? New Yorker New Media
Final Note: Don't miss Domain Mondo's post yesterday: Consumer Trust In New gTLD Domains Is Getting Worse says NCC Group - more Bad News for ICANN's new gTLDs

Have a great week!

-- John Poole, Editor, Domain Mondo




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2015-08-04

ICANN Accountability, IANA Transition, Proposals, Comments, Webinars

UPDATE August 31, 2015: Volume 9: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions - ICANN: An Update on IANA Stewardship Discussions, Date: August 31, 2015 (read the full update at the link above)

 UPDATE: Important dates in the IANA Transition and ICANN Accountability processes:

Public Comment Period on ICG's IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal closes 8 Sep 2015 

Public Comment Period for CCWG-Accountability's 2nd draft of ICANN accountability enhancements (Work Stream 1) closes 12 Sep 2015

18-19 Sep 2015 : ICG Face-to-Face Meeting, Los Angeles

30 Sep-15 Oct 2015: CCWG-Accountability's 2nd and final proposal (Work Stream 1) presented to ALAC, ASO,ccNSO, GAC and GNSO for their approval.

18-22 Oct 2015: ICANN 54 inc. ICG Face-to-Face meeting and presentation of proposals for IANAstewardship and ICANN accountability enhancements (Work Stream 1) to the ICANNBoard for subsequent transmission to the NTIA.

Week 1, Nov 2015: ICANN Board transmits IANA stewardship transition and ICANN accountability (Work Stream 1) proposals to NTIA.

Announcements from ICG (IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group) and ICANN:

1. IANA Stewardship Transition
The ICG is asking the public to review the Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to the Global Multistakeholder Community. Comments are due by the deadline of 8 September 2015 at 23:59 UTC.
  1. Thursday 6 August 2015 from 19:00-20:30 UTC time converter 
  2. Friday 7 August 2015 from 11:00-12:30 UTC time converter 
2. ICANN Accountability
The CCWG-Accountability (Cross-Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability) has published its 2nd draft for 40-day public comment--see Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability 2nd Draft Report (Work Stream 1) - ICANN. Community feedback is requested on this 2nd draft proposal of proposed enhancements to ICANN's accountability framework that the CCWG-Accountability has identified as essential to happen or be committed to before the IANA Stewardship Transition takes place (Work Stream 1). Comments are due by the deadline of 12 September 2015 at 23:59 UTC.

Community feedback (see ICANN Accountability 2nd Draft Comments) will help the CCWG-Accountability to improve its proposal and carry on with next steps, including Chartering Organizations' endorsement of the CCWG-Accountability output before it is submitted to the ICANN Board during or after ICANN 54 in Dublin in October 2015.

In order to brief the community on the contents of their 2nd draft proposal, the CCWG-Accountability Chairs will host two identical briefing webinars via Adobe Connect and dial-in (webinar details): 
  1. Tuesday 4 August from 19:00 – 21:00 UTC time converter
  2. Friday 7 August from 07:00 – 09:00 UTC time converter

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2015-03-31

US Gov GAO Requests Meeting With ICANN CCWG-Accountability Chairs

UPDATE (March 31, 2015): "... the GAO is currently engaging with a wide range of stakeholders, including members of this group. The list of questions provided is a generic one, and it is our understanding that, as far as we are concerned, the main expectation is to discuss about our process. Our key intent in this engagement will be focused on explaining our process, from the basic principles of the multistakeholder, open and transparent approach of the CCWG to the various steps we are taking to come up with WS1 proposals. Should the discussion come to contents, we will obviously stay within the grounds of tentative conclusions, as currently available to the public through, for instance, our co-chair statement. Taking note of some of the comments received, we will ask the GAO whether they would rather hear our update shortly or delay by a few weeks until our public comment is out..." -- Mathieu Weill, CCWG Co-Chair (emphasis added)

As disclosed Monday, March 30th, by ICANN's CCWG-Accountability Co-Chairs, the US Government Accountability Office [GAO] has requested a teleconference with the co-chairs of the CCWG (tentative date currently discussed is next week, 7 or 8 April). Included was the requesting email and attachment below from the GAO (emphasis added):

Subject : April 1, 2, or 3 Meeting Request CCWG-Accountability Chairs
Date : Thu, 26 Mar 2015 17:45:11

Good day, Mr. Rickert, Mr. Sanchez Ambia, and Mr. Weill:

You may recall meeting my colleagues, Derrick Collins, Alwynne Wilbur, and Kate Perl at the ICANN meeting in Singapore in February. At any rate, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been asked by the Chairs of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and its
Communications and Technology Subcommittee to review the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (NTIA) proposed transition of key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community. We are meeting with knowledgeable people and organizations to gather information for our work.

We would like to meet with you via teleconference to discuss the proposed transition from the perspective of the Accountability working group. We have provided a list of questions, below, to give you a better idea of the topics we want to discuss with you, and I’ll provide a teleconference line after confirming your availability (please “reply all” so that others can know of your availability). In addition to the discussion, we would also welcome written responses.

Would you be available for a one-hour time slot during one of the following blocks?
* Wednesday, April 1st : 10:00 – 11:00 EST
* Thursday, April 2nd : 11:00 – 12:00 EST
* Friday, April 3rd : 10:00 – 11:00 EST

We would also like to meet with Steve DelBianco and Cheryl Langdon-Orr to discuss their work with the Stress Test Work Party. Please let me know if you’d like to be part of that meeting, too.
Thank you, 
John
John Healey, Senior Analyst
Physical Infrastructure Team
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Washington DC, 20548

List of Questions: GAO Engagement on the Internet Domain Name System - Discussion Guide - Background on GAO’s Engagement

GAO has been asked by the Chairs of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and its Communications and Technology Subcommittee to review the National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) planned transition of its oversight of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions to the global multistakeholder community. We are meeting with key people and organizations to gather input on
· the process used to develop a transition proposal and how the process considers risks associated with the transition as identified by stakeholders and
· The extent to which NTIA’s core requirements for the transition provide an effective framework to evaluate the transition proposal.

Topics for Discussion
1. What is your experience related to the IANA functions and NTIA’s role?
2. How would you describe NTIA’s current role with regard to the IANA functions (e.g., stewardship, administrative/clerical, backstop, etc)?
3. If you consider the implications of transitioning NTIA’s role to a global multistakeholder community, what are the potential risks, if any, that come to mind?
a. What risks can you identify if the transition does occur (i.e., such as any technical, operational, or accountability risks that are currently mitigated by NTIA’s contract with ICANN)?
b. What are the potential risks if the transition does not occur?
c. Are you aware of the list of contingencies being considered by the cross-community working group on enhancing ICANN accountability (CCWG-Accountability)? If so, to what extent do you think this is a comprehensive list? Which risks, if any, are present regardless of NTIA’s oversight role?

4. Who, specifically, of the multi-stakeholder community might be most impacted by a transition of NTIA’s role? Are these potentially-impacted stakeholders sufficiently represented by the discussion and efforts to develop a transition proposal?
a. [If stakeholder is from one of the multi-stakeholder constituency groups in ICANN] What is the process for raising concerns that arise from the perspective of your constituency to the multi-stakeholder community and to what extent do you think this process is effective in ensuring that all issues are considered in policy development and decision making?

5. What are the most important issues for the transition proposal to address? Do you have a view on what structure or approach could most effectively address these issues? 

6. What factors should be considered when evaluating transition proposals? To what extent do NTIA’s core requirements address potential risks? NTIA will require that the proposal:
a. supports and enhances the multistakeholder model of Internet governance,
b. maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet domain name system (DNS),
c. meets the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services;
d. maintains the openness of the Internet, and,
e. does not replace NTIA’s oversight role with a government-led or intergovernmental organization solution.

The CCWG-Accountability discussion thread has been very active subsequent to the disclosure of the GAO request above--including this (emphasis added):

Colleagues
With due respect to all, I think you are overreacting and over thinking the GAO request quite a bit. Greg is precisely right that this is an invitation to a conversation – not something we can manage the scope of.  Either we say “no” or we say “yes” and if we say “yes” they will ask whatever they want to ask.  I should add that GAO is transparent – so the way they induce acceptance is their practice of noting on the public record who declined to speak with them in whole or in part.  That image: “We requested the opportunity to speak with the co-Chairs of the CCWG, but they declined our request ….” Is about the worst thing I could imagine for public confidence in our work.

More importantly, as Carlos correctly pointed out, though these are relatively modest staffers, their report when issued will have significant influence with Congress.  Now it may be that we don’t care about that – but assuming we do it is incumbent upon us to put our best foot forward.  If, hypothetically, the report found critical flaws in our work and reported same that would, even if completely incorrect, be very disruptive.  Conversely, if it lauds our work as thoughtful etc., it would be of great benefit to our efforts.  To the extent the report errs, if it does so because we did not engage we would have nobody but ourselves to blame.

So the bottom line is that, I think, we should say “yes” with some enthusiasm.  We have work product of which we are justifiably proud and if we can’t say that to the GAO, I would wonder why. To be sure, the co-chairs should not bind the CCWG and should make clear they do not speak “on behalf of” the group – but they can and should be authorized to tout our work as useful and an essential step to satisfying the NTIA (and, derivatively, Congress) that the transition will occur without a loss of accountability.

That having been said, I do think that the Co-Chairs might reasonably ask for an extra week or two – so that the meeting would occur after our proposal is released to the public for comment, as we anticipate will happen in mid-late April.  Then the Co-Chairs will have substance to talk about.  This is also something GAO will understand as they are often all about good process.  Bear in mind, however, that the GAO has deadlines of its own.  I believe I was told (though I can’t recall by whom) that the House Committee has demanded this report no later than June 30 …. -- Paul Rosenzweig


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2015-03-22

IANA Stewardship Transition, Internet Society Webinar and Audio

IANA Stewardship Transition Webinar:

The US Government announced in March, 2014, that it wants to transition its role and responsibilities with regard IANA functions to the global multistakeholder community. The Internet Society (ISOC) organized this webinar on 4 March 2015 about the IANA Stewardship transition.

Participants:
  • Patrik Fältström, Vice Chair, IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group
  • Demi Getschko, Internet Society appointee to IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group
  • Eliot Lear, Member, Internet Architecture Board and author of the Internet Engineering Task Force IANAPLAN document
  • Nurani Nimpuno, Member, Consolidated RIR IANA Stewardship Proposal (CRISP) Team
  • Matthew Shears, Participant, ICANN Cross Community Working Group
  • Theresa Swinehart, ICANN
The webinar was moderated by Internet Society Senior Policy Advisor Konstantinos Komaitis

Soundcloud audio of the webinar:



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2015-03-04

Affirmation of Commitments, ICANN Board, Global Public Interest

The global multistakeholder community whose interests (the global Public Interest) the ICANN Board of Directors ultimately represents, adopted the Affirmation of Commitments together with the the United States Department of Commerce, on September 30, 2009. Public Interest is mentioned no fewer than 5 times--below are excerpts--full document at the link below:

Affirmation of Commitments - US and ICANN: 1. This document constitutes an Affirmation of Commitments (Affirmation) by the United States Department of Commerce ("DOC") and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), a not-for-profit corporation. In recognition of the conclusion of the Joint Project Agreement and to institutionalize and memorialize the technical coordination of the Internet's domain name and addressing system (DNS), globally by a private sector led organization, the parties agree as follows:
....
3. This document affirms key commitments by DOC and ICANN, including commitments to: (a) ensure that decisions made related to the global technical coordination of the DNS are made in the public interest and are accountable and transparent; (b) preserve the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; (c) promote competition, consumer trust, and consumer choice in the DNS marketplace; and (d) facilitate international participation in DNS technical coordination.

4. DOC affirms its commitment to a multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for DNS technical coordination that acts for the benefit of global Internet users. A private coordinating process, the outcomes of which reflect the public interest, is best able to flexibly meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users. ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.
....
5. DOC recognizes the importance of global Internet users being able to use the Internet in their local languages and character sets, and endorses the rapid introduction of internationalized country code top level domain names (ccTLDs), provided related security, stability and resiliency issues are first addressed. Nothing in this document is an expression of support by DOC of any specific plan or proposal for the implementation of new generic top level domain names (gTLDs) or is an expression by DOC of a view that the potential consumer benefits of new gTLDs outweigh the potential costs.

6. DOC also affirms the United States Government's commitment to ongoing participation in ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). DOC recognizes the important role of the GAC with respect to ICANN decision-making and execution of tasks and of the effective consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the Internet DNS.

7. ICANN commits to adhere to transparent and accountable budgeting processes, fact-based policy development, cross-community deliberations, and responsive consultation procedures that provide detailed explanations of the basis for decisions, including how comments have influenced the development of policy consideration, and to publish each year an annual report that sets out ICANN's progress against ICANN's bylaws, responsibilities, and strategic and operating plans. In addition, ICANN commits to provide a thorough and reasoned explanation of decisions taken, the rationale thereof and the sources of data and information on which ICANN relied.

8. ICANN affirms its commitments to: (a) maintain the capacity and ability to coordinate the Internet DNS at the overall level and to work for the maintenance of a single, interoperable Internet; (b) remain a not for profit corporation, headquartered in the United States of America with offices around the world to meet the needs of a global community; and (c) to operate as a multi-stakeholder, private sector led organization with input from the public, for whose benefit ICANN shall in all events act. ICANN is a private organization and nothing in this Affirmation should be construed as control by any one entity.

9. Recognizing that ICANN will evolve and adapt to fulfill its limited, but important technical mission of coordinating the DNS, ICANN further commits to take the following specific actions together with ongoing commitment reviews specified below:

9.1 Ensuring accountability, transparency and the interests of global Internet users: ICANN commits to maintain and improve robust mechanisms for public input, accountability, and transparency so as to ensure that the outcomes of its decision-making will reflect the public interest and be accountable to all stakeholders by: (a) continually assessing and improving ICANN Board of Directors (Board) governance which shall include an ongoing evaluation of Board performance, the Board selection process, the extent to which Board composition meets ICANN's present and future needs, and the consideration of an appeal mechanism for Board decisions; (b) assessing the role and effectiveness of the GAC and its interaction with the Board and making recommendations for improvement to ensure effective consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the DNS; (c) continually assessing and improving the processes by which ICANN receives public input (including adequate explanation of decisions taken and the rationale thereof); (d) continually assessing the extent to which ICANN's decisions are embraced, supported and accepted by the public and the Internet community; and (e) assessing the policy development process to facilitate enhanced cross community deliberations, and effective and timely policy development. ICANN will organize a review of its execution of the above commitments no less frequently than every three years, with the first such review concluding no later than December 31, 2010. The review will be performed by volunteer community members and the review team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the Chair of the Board of ICANN, the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the DOC, representatives of the relevant ICANN Advisory Committees and Supporting Organizations and independent experts. Composition of the review team will be agreed jointly by the Chair of theGAC (in consultation with GAC members) and the Chair of the Board of ICANN. Resulting recommendations of the reviews will be provided to the Board and posted for public comment. The Board will take action within six months of receipt of the recommendations. Each of the foregoing reviews shall consider the extent to which the assessments and actions undertaken by ICANN have been successful in ensuring that ICANN is acting transparently, is accountable for its decision-making, and acts in the public interest....

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2015-02-16

Response to US Senator and Congressman re: NTIA, IANA, ICANN

Below is the published comment by the Editor of Domain Mondo in response to the CircleID post: Ensuring Trust in Internet Governance by Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the US House Judiciary Committee and Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, concerning the NTIA, ICANN, and the IANA transition:

"NTIA wants to transfer IANA to the global multistakeholder community--really? In Singapore at ICANN 52, ICANN and NTIA were pressuring stakeholders to hurry up and hand IANA over to ICANN--ICANN is not the global multistakeholder community nor truly representative of it. ICANN, a California non-profit corporation with an essentially self-selected Board of Directors, and no membership, is, and has been for years, largely captured by special interests within the domain name industry--that is why NTIA almost pulled the IANA contract away from ICANN in 2012. Nothing has really changed since then, except the Snowden revelations came to light and the U.S. is now under international pressure to let go of its historic role of Internet oversight. The idea that ICANN could fulfill NTIA's historic stewardship role is ludicrous based on ICANN's own track record. At the same time, NTIA has been less than fully honest in the announcement of its intentions. In March, 2014, NTIA said it wanted to be transitioned out of its role. What is NTIA's role? NTIA said then that its role was as historic steward of the Internet DNS with contract rights and authority over the IANA functions and Internet root zone. Yet, the ICANN-convened process, requested by NTIA, is only focused on the IANA contract, not stewardship responsibilities nor Internet root zone management! How dysfunctional--or disingenuous? Sometime after March, 2014, NTIA also, apparently, decided that ICANN accountability should also be part of this whole process--NTIA said nothing about ICANN accountability in March, 2014, but now NTIA's Larry Strickling says somehow that needs to be included in any proposal that is submitted to NTIA. WOW! Never mind that it will take years to both fully implement and then judge whether any ICANN internal accountability changes are effective, and to what extent. Meanwhile, NTIA still maintains Congressional approval is not needed for any of the transition process. Congress and the NTIA need to review this July, 2000, GAO report. NTIA also needs to be honest and transparent with the U.S. Congress, the American people, and the global multistakeholder community. NTIA (and ICANN) should accept the fact that a majority of people in the U.S., as well as a majority of the global multistakeholder community, justifiably lack confidence and trust in ICANN having sole power and authority over the Internet DNS. NETmundial principles, as well as historic principles of the free and open Internet, actually contravene this vision of an all-powerful ICANN, a single point of failure, with no external accountability nor oversight. I am currently a participant in the process ICANN convened at the request of NTIA. My views herein are only my own. Others have differing views. What is not helpful is NTIA being duplicitous or manipulative, less than fully honest and transparent, as indicated above. At this point, as both a U.S. citizen and member of the global multistakeholder community, I want NTIA transitioned out of its role, as soon as possible--NTIA is no longer an effective steward, and the world is demanding change. However, just walking away and leaving dysfunctional ICANN in charge is not the answer. The challenge is in coming up with an effective solution that has buy-in from the global multistakeholder community while ensuring a free, open, stable and secure Internet for future generations. External solutions to achieve this have been proposed and are currently being considered. I have personally sought input from Ass't Sec Strickling (with copy to Secretary Pritzker) without response. Hopefully Congress, the House and Senate, can get some answers and shed some light on NTIA's true intentions (e.g., why did NTIA exclude stewardship and Internet root zone management responsibilities, from the ICANN-convened process, and what are NTIA's future plans or intentions for those, specifically?)."

-- John Poole, Editor, Domain Mondo

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2014-07-05

ICANN Process for New gTLDs Dysfunctional -- from the beginning

"When a decision is taken about a possible new top-level domain, ICANN's job is to work out, in a transparent and accountable manner, whether it is really in the best interest of the world as a whole, not just of those launching the new domain." -- Tim Berners-Lee
Jean Guillon writing in CircleID asks: "What if France Had Applied for a .WINE New gTLD? ....Well… the situation would be the exact same — the applicant would be in front of three other .WINE applicants with this exact same question: how do I win the auction?... "Standard applications", "Community applications" and "Geographic applications" were created by ICANN to offer a range of procedures for applicants to decide whether "they" considered if their application was sensitive or not. ICANN has no "conseil des sages" or CFT procedure upfront to do a first check up in the new gTLD application process. So what now?"

The whole ICANN process for new gTLDs was dysfunctional from the beginning. There should have been no fees such as the $185,000 per application fee, and no auctions. There should have been a process to receive nominations for new generic top-level domains. Anyone could submit a nomination for new gTLD name extension: .web, .app, etc., with the nominating form indicating the "public interest" rationale and need for the new gTLD extension. A nominating committee to review and process the nominations would be composed of members of the global internet community, including but not limited to, domain name registrants, commercial, civil society, and government representatives (with access to experts in naming protocols, marketing, trademarks, economics, technical and other matters). The nominating committee would specifically exclude from membership registry representatives and anyone else who intended to apply to become a registry of any new gTLD or provide services to current or new gTLDs registry operators. The nominating committee would evaluate the nominations, to determine which ones ranked highest in terms of both rationale and need, in the public interest, perhaps even conducting polls for general world opinion and consensus as to preferences among the nominated new gTLDs. From that process, the nominating committee would determine and publish ranked lists of proposed new gTLDs, which would be published to the global multistakeholder community for comment, for a period of not less than thirty days. Once the comment period closed, the ranked lists and comments would be submitted to the ICANN Board (or its designee) for final determination of which new gTLDs would be added to the global domain name system.

Then, and only then, the process of soliciting and selecting the registry operator for each new gTLD would begin. That process would end with the selected registry operator executing its contract with ICANN -- ICANN acting on behalf of the global internet community. The registry operator contracts would include terms requiring operation of each new gTLD registry in the public interest for a term of years, at the lowest possible cost in annual domain name registration fees, all of which would be strictly regulated by ICANN. Financial soundness of each registry operator applicant would be one, but only one, of many criteria by which the ICANN Board or its designee would make the final registry operator selections. No fees would be paid to ICANN by the selected or applicant registry operators. ICANN would receive only the fee paid upon registration/transfer of each domain name -- ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, charges a mandatory yearly fee of $0.18 for each year of domain registration per domain name. (Registry operators would be required to pay annual assessments for operation of the internet root zone and other technical IANA functions, directly to IANA, a separate entity.)

Every current and new gTLD should be considered to be the "property" of the global internet community, regulated by ICANN, and operated by each registry, in the "public interest." ICANN was never originally intended to be an ATM or "cash machine" -- "put in your $185,000 and we will issue you your new gTLD which you can do with pretty much as you like" nor an issuer of new gTLDs to the highest bidder -- Glossary | ICANN New gTLDs: "Auction -- A method for allocating property or goods to the highest bidder." Nor were generic top-level domains ever originally intended to be licenses to make profits at the expense of the public interest -- damaging trademarks, businesses, and others in the process.

But somewhere along the line, ICANN stopped listening to people like Esther Dyson and Tim Berners-Lee, and decided to sell out the public interest for private gain and profit. In the process, ICANN has irreparably damaged the internet and its domain name system for which it was supposed to be a protector and steward.

John Poole
Domain Mondo
July 4, 2014





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2014-06-24

Will ICANN Board Disclose New Swiss Legal Structure at ICANN 50?

Will ICANN Be The Next International Organisation In Geneva? | Intellectual Property Watch | 2 March 2014: "During a visit to France last week, Fadi Chehadé, the CEO and president of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), announced that his Board of Directors has given him the green light to further explore reforms of ICANN. Among them is the possibility of creating a parallel ICANN international structure, likely based in Geneva... A resolution of the ICANN Board from 17 February created presidential advisory groups [pdf] established to work on five issues. One advisory group will explore the idea to “Establish complementary parallel international structure to enhance ICANN’s global legitimacy.” Although the document does not refer to Geneva, Chehadé in several talks during his visit in France strongly referred to that possibility.... Interviewed by France Culture radio program “Place de la toile” [program in French] on 22 February, Chehadé explained that he would like to see the creation of a parallel structure for ICANN under the Swiss legal system...." See also Fadi Chehade in this 21 Feb 2014 hearing before the French Senate (video in French).

So will the ICANN Board of Directors disclose to the global multistakeholder community its plans to change (or create a parallel) ICANN legal structure under Swiss law at the ICANN 50 London Meeting as directed in ICANN Board Resolution 2014.02.17.01, adopted February 17, 2014?

"President’s Globalization Advisory Group on: Legal Structure: Establish complimentary parallel international structure to enhance ICANN’s global legitimacy. Consider complementary parallel international structure within scope of ICANN’s mandate. Composition: Sébastien Bachollet; Olga Madruga-Forti; Erika Mann; Gonzalo Navarro; Ray Plzak" (source: ICANN pdf).

 Approved Board Resolutions | Special Meeting of the ICANN Board of Directors on February 17, 2014:
Resolution 2014.02.17.01 ".... Whereas, the continued globalization of ICANN must evolve in several ways, including: ... evolving the policy structures to serve and scale to the needs of the global community, and identify opportunities for the future legal structures and IANA globalization.... Whereas, as part of its continued globalization efforts, ICANN should establish certain "President's Globalization Advisory Groups" composed of Board members to address the following areas: Affirmation of Commitments ("AOC"), policy structures, legal structure, root server system, the IANA multistakeholder accountability, and Internet governance.

 "Resolved (2014.02.17.01), the Board approves the creation of several President's Globalization Advisory Groups in order to support further ICANN globalization... The President's Globalization Advisory Groups will then make recommendations to the Board, which the Board will report during ICANN 50 London Meeting. These Advisory Groups will deal with the following topics:... policy structures; legal structure;... Internet governance... the President and CEO shall have the authority to change the Advisory Groups and their composition from time to time, without requiring a further resolution.

 "RATIONALE FOR RESOLUTION 2014.02.17.01...The continued globalization of ICANN must evolve in several ways, including:... identify opportunities for the future legal structures and IANA globalization. This is an Organizational Administrative Function for which public comment is not required."





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