My .NET Comment Was REJECTED (at first) By ICANN, Was Yours?

Public comments on the Proposed Renewal of .NET Registry Agreement close 30 May 2017 at 23:59 UTC, which is 7:59pm EDT (US).

Because I had a busy Tuesday morning out of the office, I stayed up late last night to finish my comment (8 pages long--embedded below) and submitted it very early Tuesday morning (EDT - US) before going to bed. Right after submitting the comment, I received the ICANN email:

Hours later I received the following email from ICANN:

I discovered that email when I returned to my office Tuesday afternoon, and immediately responded:

I also forwarded a copy of the foregoing to the ICANN Ombudsman and ICANN Complaints Office with the following email:

I then received an email from ICANN Complaints Office:

And then I heard from an ICANN GDD (Global Domains Division) staff member:

And then I received the following from another ICANN staff member (Carlos Reyes):

And after submitting my comment again (exactly the same way I had originally sent it), I received the following:

Here's my comment (pdf), also embedded in full below. All comments "accepted" by ICANN may be viewed here. In the course of the chaotic back-and-forth I asked the ICANN Ombudsman and Complaints Officer "how many comments are being censored (rejected) by ICANN?" and never heard back. If your comment was rejected by ICANN, please let me know via Twitter @DomainMondo or via the email address at the bottom of the DomainMondo.com web page.

My Comment Conclusion (pp. 7-8):

IV. Conclusion

1) RPMs specifically designed, and applicable to new gTLDs, are not appropriate for legacy gTLDs .COM, .NET, and .ORG, and I commend ICANN for resisting pressure from trademark and other special interests who may urge otherwise.

2) Verisign is a capable and qualified registry operator to continue operating the .NET generic top-level domain.

3) However, I have three objections to the proposed renewal of the .NET registry agreement, the first two are substantive and deal with pricing, and the third is an “ICANN process” objection:

1. The Section 7.2 ICANN fee of $0.75 per .NET domain name is discriminatory and unconscionable to .NET domain name registrants, and ICANN should reduce it to $0.25 (similar to other gTLDs). What may have been negotiated or appropriate in 2005, is no longer applicable 12 years later. ICANN should be ashamed for being so greedy and unfair to .NET registrants who are the ones bearing this cost.

2. The Section 7.3(a) provision for 10% compounded annual increases in .NET registration, renewal and transfer fees is unconscionable, particularly considering .NET has approximately 15 million domain name registrations, and the publicly reported profitability of Verisign, and its low cost of operations. It may be easy for ICANN staff to “roll over” and continue using the same boilerplate from previous renewals, but it has no justification based on reality—industry operating costs, market conditions, economic factors, and other relevant financial factors. This “formula” would lead to a doubling of registration fees every 7.2 years (Rule of 72). ICANN legal and GDD staff and management need a refresher course on good public stewardship and how to represent the global internet community in the global public interest.

Compare the ccTLD pricing for ccTLD .US ($6.50) with only about 2.5 million domain name registrations.

Approval of this proposed renewal with the $0.75 ICANN fee and 10% compounded annual increases in registration/renewal/transfer fees intact, will most likely cause renewed calls for government(s) to oversee ICANN, or replace ICANN with a new or existing intergovernmental multi-party or multistakeholder organization which can protect consumers (registrants), and the global public interest.

3. ICANN’s process for gTLD registry renewals is dysfunctional. Before beginning renewal “discussions” or negotiations with any registry operator, ICANN should first solicit comments from registrants, registrars, and other interested parties about the performance of the operator and suggestions for changes in the registry agreement. Only after that initial comment period has concluded should ICANN begin discussions with the registry operator. This is a simple change that will result in ICANN staff being much better informed and prepared to represent registrants, registrars, and the global internet community in renewal discussions with the registry operator.

-- John Poole, editor, DomainMondo.com

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DISCLAIMER

Incompetent ICANN Struggles With Its Domain Names Marketplace Index

ICANN Timeline: gTLD Marketplace Health Index 1.0 Work Plan [Draft]

Three years of close observation of ICANN leads one to the inescapable conclusion to never underestimate the incompetence of ICANN management and staff when it comes to domain names. Why ICANN would be creating hundreds of new gTLDs (new generic top-level domains) when it obviously has little or no real understanding of the domain name marketplace, is beyond comprehension. Search ICANN.org for its Marketplace Index--https://www.icann.org/search/#!/?searchText=Marketplace Index--and you may find the following:

• At-Large gTLD Marketplace Health Index Proposal: Call for Comments and Volunteers Workspace - At-Large Policy Development (wiki)
• gTLD Marketplace Health Index (wiki) (current)
• First call for comments: Close Date 22 Jan 2016; Comments; ICANN Staff Report on Comments
• ICANN gTLD Marketplace Health Index (Beta) July 2016: The "gTLD Marketplace Health Index (Beta)" includes anonymous, high-level data about gTLD registry operators, registrars and registrants, which ICANN collects for business purposes. There are many other potential sources of data to consider as ICANN and the community collaborate in developing additional metrics that can be used to quantify the health of the marketplace.--ICANN, see also this. 
• Second call for comments:  Close Date 9 Sep 2016; Comments; ICANN Staff Report on Comments;

September 6, 2016: Comment from John Poole, Editor of DomainMondo.com, and domain name registrant, Re: ICANN's gTLDMarketplace Health Index (Beta): Call for Comments

1. I repeat and incorporate by reference, as if fully set out herein, the entirety of mycomment found here: https://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-gtld-marketplace-health-17nov15/pdfQsziB8ArJy.pdf submitted on January 8, 2016, in response to your earlier gTLDMarketplace Health Index Proposal: Call for Comments. You have ignored not only my earlier comment referenced above, but most of the other comments submitted at that time, including comments by ICANN's own Business Constituency and IPC, all of which can be read here: https://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-gtld-marketplace-health-17nov15/. 

2. Your gTLD Marketplace Health Index (Beta) is severely flawed and should not be used. You have failed to define the "marketplace" properly, you have ignored "pricing" as a key component of determining "Marketplace Health" (you should be tracking, and publishing daily, wholesale and retail pricing, as well as corresponding registration numbers, for each and every TLD in the global DNS if you are indeed interested in "Marketplace Health"). You are measuring such metrics as "geographic diversity" which may be irrelevant or invalid for reasons I discussed in my earlier comment and which your "expert" ProfessorHemant Bhargava also cited. We live in a global economy. GoDaddy and other registrars do business worldwide via the internet. Wake up ICANN, it's the 21st Century! (Get out of your "hub" mentality and into a "global" mentality.) 

3. It appears ICANN management and staff are too incompetent, inept, or conflicted, to develop a useful, relevant and valid domain names "Marketplace Health Index." I would suggest taking note of all the comments submitted previously and this time, and outsourcing the entire project to CENTR https://www.centr.org/ and/or the Internet Society http://www.internetsociety.org/ or some other entity competent to do the job.
--Respectfully submitted, John Poole, Editor of DomainMondo.com, and domain name registrant

Read all the other comments submitted here, but note particularly, the comment (pdf) prepared by Andrew Simpson, Principal Data Scientist, Verisign, embedded in full below, which begins with the following "Summary":

"ICANN has decided to move forward with creating the Beta Marketplace Health Index but has not yet created a meaningful dialog that would permit a consensus to be reached among various stakeholders impacted by the index. Thus far, ICANN has requested public comment on their initial gTLD Marketplace Health Index Proposal. Following this initial round of comments, ICANN convened an advisory panel where they presented a revised draft to the panelists who each individually sent additional feedback to ICANN. ICANN did not disclose to the members of the advisory panel how the feedback that panelists provided would be addressed. Instead, ICANN’s staff seems to have relied solely on recommendations from its funded research, which was edited and reviewed by ICANN staff alone. The resulting Beta report therefore lacks clarity around goals – as noted in the community feedback -- and continues to arbitrarily define an industry marketplace that does not reflect end users’ experience nor the actual marketplace in which TLDs compete." (emphasis added)

Simpson goes on to note: 1) further refinement of goals is necessary (robust competition, thriving/fair marketplace); 2) Marketplace Scope needs to be expanded--"gTLDs and ccTLDs coexist in the eyes of end users"; 3) The process needs to be clearly defined;  and in regard to Marketplace Stability and Trust (emphasis added):

"The ambiguity of the current definition allows one to conclude that the metrics are measuring whether ICANN has created a stable set of vendors that it [ICANN] can trust. If the desired goal is to evaluate the perspective of any others in the marketplace, such as domain name users, then the metrics need to be changed to be far more comprehensive."

 So where is the Marketplace Index project going now? Best guess is here:

gTLD Marketplace Health Index 1.0 Work Plan [October 3, 2016 Draft]:

• (26 October) Advisory Panel Meeting 1–Overview of next steps, discussion of scope and definitions, high-level issues
• (Nov 3-9 exact date/time TBD): ICANN57 community session-project overview and request for feedback
• (Nov 3-9 exact date/time TBD): ICANN 57 Advisory Panel working meeting (Topics likely overall scope, metrics category definitions)
• (12/1 (exact date TBD)): Advisory Panel meeting-finalize discussion of scope and definitions
• (Week of 5, 12 Dec) Staff–develop discussion list of proposed v 1.0 metrics for discussion with Advisory Panel
• (Approx 16 Dec): AP call–overview of proposed v. 1.0 metrics
• (19 Dec-17 January Lag for holiday break, AP review and feedback
• (18-31 January) AP meetings, feedback period on "robust competition" metrics
• (1 Feb-14 Feb) AP meetings, feedback period on "marketplace stability" metrics
• (15-28 Feb) AP meetings, feedback period on "trust" metrics
• Face-to-Face meeting at ICANN58-March 2017
• (22-28 March) Finalize metrics list for 1.0
• (end March/early April) draft/publish RFP for data source, if required

Comment by Andrew Simpson, Principal Data Scientist, Verisign, submitted Sep 9, 2016:



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DISCLAIMER

IANA Transition Comment Deadline, Domain Mondo Editor Comments

The deadline to submit comments on the IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal is today, September 8, 2015, at 23:59 UTC which is 7:59 PM ET (US). After the conclusion of the public comment period, the ICG will make a final determination about whether to recommend that NTIA approve the transition proposal. More information including Instructions for How to Submit Public Comments is here | https://www.ianacg.org/calls-for-input/combined-proposal-public-comment-period/.

Below are the comments submitted by the Editor of Domain Mondo:

Questions Concerning the Proposal as a Whole
1) Completeness and clarity: Is the combined proposal complete? Each of the operational community proposals contains aspects to be completed in the future when the proposal is implemented. Is the combined proposal specified in sufficient detail such that it can be evaluated against the NTIA criteria?

Numbers: Complete;
Protocol Parameters: Complete;
Names community: INCOMPLETE due to its "dependencies" upon the final work product of WS-1 of CCWG-Accountability, which at this point appears to be unacceptable or inadequate in its present form as contained in the "2nd draft report" published for a comment period ending Sept 12, 2015.

2) Compatibility and interoperability: Do the operational community proposals work together in a single proposal? Do they suggest any incompatible arrangements where compatibility appears to be required? Is the handling of any conflicting overlaps between the functions resolved in a workable manner?

The numbers and protocols proposals work together as a single proposal, with ICANN as the IANA functions operator (IFO). The names proposal is incompatible and inconsistent and results in creating a second IFO (for the "Names community") called PTI, a to-be-created corporation. This is creating unnecessary complexity, incurring unnecessary costs (CWG-Stewardship has reportedly incurred millions of dollars in legal fees, with more to come), and deriving little, if any, net benefit for the names community or the global Internet community. All of this could have been handled internally to ICANN through new bylaws whereby the gTLDs and ccTLDs could comprise a CSC and provisions providing for the selection of a different IFO than ICANN should that need arise. The irony in all of this is that the IANA department within ICANN has always performed its job well as far as I have been able to determine. Certainly numbers and protocols think so. Unfortunately, as the ICG is well aware, CWG-stewardship or “names community” is a dysfunctional group (described by one ICG member, the esteemed Prof. Mueller, as “a collection of warring interests”), who wasted months trying to develop an overly complex "turnkey" proposal referred to as "Contract Co." only to jettison that concept for a "compromise" "hybrid" "solution" now called PTI. This is all indicative of what Nassim Taleb refers to as the "fragilista" who “make you engage in policies and actions, all artificial, in which the benefits are small and visible, and the side effects (are) potentially severe and invisible.” Unfortunately this is also consistent with the tendency of many of ICANN's "names" stakeholders in ICANN policymaking processes to prefer complex dysfunctional solutions over simple functional solutions, in order to increase their "insider" knowledge and status, increase costs, and form barriers to any effective participation by "outsiders" from the global Internet community. Can we (ICANN and the global Internet community) live with this incompatibility and the potential "conflicting overlaps?" As far as the ICG proposal is concerned, I am confident the ICANN Board, management and staff can jury-rig the "workarounds" necessary to "make it work."

3) Accountability: Do the operational community proposals together include appropriate and properly supported independent accountability mechanisms for running the IANA functions? Are there any gaps in overall accountability under the single proposal?

Numbers and Protocols proposals have accountability built-in, consistent with years of experience working with ICANN as IFO. Names proposal? Unknown. CWG-Stewardship claims its new structures' accountability mechanisms will work. Time will tell. See also #6 below.

4) Workability: Do the results of any tests or evaluations of workability that were included in the operational community proposals conflict with each other or raise possible concerns when considered in combination?

I covered this in #2 above.

Questions Concerning NTIA Criteria
5) Do you believe the proposal supports and enhances the multistakeholder model? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

For better or worse, I think the proposal is consistent with the multistakeholder model.

6) Do you believe the proposal maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

No. Read Verisign's 10-Q, July 23, 2015 (p.29): "Under its new gTLD program, ICANN intends to recommend for delegation into the root zone a large number of new gTLDs potentially within a compressed timeframe. On October 23, 2013, NTIA began to authorize, and Verisign began effectuating, the delegation of the new gTLDs. In view of our role as the Root Zone Maintainer, and as a root operator, we face increased risks should ICANN’s delegation of these new gTLDs, which represent unprecedented changes to the root zone in volume and frequency, cause security and stability problems within the DNS and/or for parties who rely on the DNS. Such risks include potential instability of the DNS including potential fragmentation of the DNS should ICANN’s delegations create sufficient instability, and potential claims based on our role in the root zone provisioning and delegation process. These risks, alone or in the aggregate, have the potential to cause serious harm to our Registry Services business. Further, our business could also be harmed through security, stability and resiliency degradation if the delegation of new gTLDs into the root zone causes problems to certain components of the DNS ecosystem or other aspects of the global DNS, or other relying parties are negatively impacted as a result of domain name collisions, such as exposure or other leakage of private or sensitive information. Additionally, DNS Security Extensions (“DNSSEC”) enabled in the root zone and at other levels of the DNS require new preventative maintenance functions and operational practices that did not exist prior to the introduction of DNSSEC. Any failure by Verisign or the IANA functions operator to comply with stated practices, such as those outlined in relevant DNSSEC Practice Statements, introduces risk to DNSSEC relying parties and other Internet users and consumers of the DNS, which could have a material adverse impact on our business." http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/VRSN/368398346x0xS1014473-15-68/1014473/filing.pdf

7) Do you believe the proposal meets the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary. Please indicate if you are a customer or partner of the IANA services.

Yes, unless one or more "customers and partners of the IANA services" state differently during this comment period.

8) Do you believe the proposal maintains the openness of the Internet? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

Yes, subject to the reservations expressed in #1 and #6 above.

9) Do you have any concerns that the proposal is replacing NTIA's role with a government-led or inter-governmental organization solution? If yes, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary. If not, please explain why.

No.

10) Do you believe that the implementation of the proposal will continue to uphold the NTIA criteria in the future? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

I think all of this is probably just a temporary iteration, necessary in order to end US government "oversight." After this is finished and implemented, I don't think anybody will mention or even consider "NTIA criteria" in the future.

11) Do you believe the ICG report and executive summary accurately reflect all necessary aspects of the overall proposal? If not, please explain what modifications you believe are necessary.

No modifications necessary, provided the provisions for transfer of the IANA trademarks and domain names to the IETF Trust (see numbers proposal) is implemented in a way that ICANN may continue to use the IANA marks and domain names as a licensee so long as it or its controlled entity and affiliate, PTI, performs IANA functions.

General Questions
12) Do you have any general comments for the ICG about the proposal?

ICG should steer clear of the CCWG-Accountability proposal even though the "names proposal" has "dependencies" that might be affected. That CCWG-Accountability process looked like a "rush job" from my close observation, and now the ICANN Board is engaged and proposing changes. I haven't seen any Board specifics, but in any event, that is not within ICG's remit (be thankful). I also agree with the sentiments expressed by Brian Carpenter (Submission ID: 2) in regard to #3 and #6:

• #3--"I don't see any way that ICANN itself is held accountable for the consequences of its policy decisions (e.g. creating large numbers of unnecessary gTLDs for no discernible motive except money)."
• #6--"I've been concerned since 1998 that unchecked expansion of the number of gTLDs will eventually take us into uncharted territory from a technical resilience point of view. I see no technical and operational feedback mechanism to protect us against this operational risk in the proposal."

Also, while I do not agree with some of the specifics, I am sympathetic to the frustration expressed in the comments submitted by Parminder Jeet Singh (Submission ID: 19).

-- John Poole, Editor, Domain Mondo

Read other comments submitted here.


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DISCLAIMER