Showing posts with label Domain Mondo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Domain Mondo. Show all posts

2015-09-15

ICANN CCWG-Accountability Co-Chair Comments on the Public Comments


Mathieu Weill is co-chair of ICANN's Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG-Accountability). In the tweet embedded above he is referring to the public comments submitted in response to the CCWG's 2nd Draft Report (Work Stream 1), for which the comment period ended September 12. All of the comments submitted may be reviewed here.

Mathieu's reference to Domain Mondo above is in reference to the comment submitted by John Poole, editor of Domain Mondo, which may be read in full here (pdf), excerpts below:

To CCWG-Accountability:
".... Your proposal, though well-intentioned, is unacceptable and fundamentally flawed. You have failed to follow your own Charter, and in your “rush to meet a deadline” you have failed to achieve the charter’s stated goal: a proposal which enhances ICANN’s accountability towards all stakeholders—i.e., the global multi-stakeholder community. Instead, you have focused solely on a power-game of “who’s on top”--the ICANN Board of Directors or the few well-resourced, special interests, who dominate and control the so-called “ICANN stakeholder community” which is not representative of, nor even accountable to the global Internet community a/k/a global multi-stakeholder community. Your proposal does not “enhance ICANN’s accountability towards all stakeholders.” It does subject the ICANN Board of Directors to greater direct manipulation, control, and capture by the “special interests” which NTIA’s stewardship and the Affirmation of Commitments had prevented, to some degree. Your proposal, as it stands, is therefore not in the public interest, nor is it in the best interests of the global multi-stakeholder community. In fact, your proposal is a step backwards and will hasten the demise of ICANN within just a few years, at the insistence of a global multi-stakeholder community, fed up with the avarice of those self-serving “ICANN community stakeholders” or “special interests” who disrespect the values and ideals of Jon Postel and his peers as expressed in RFC 1591: “The designated manager [of a TLD] is the trustee of the top-level domain for … the global Internet community."  Whatever happened to the fiduciary standard of duties owed by gTLD (and ccTLD) registry operators to the global Internet community? .... Unless you are willing to backtrack and spend the necessary time—at a minimum, six months or more—to reconsider, redraft and correct your fundamentally flawed proposal, you should sit down in LA later this month and honestly try to work out something with the [ICANN] Board--setting aside your collective egos, your obvious “sunk cost bias” in favor of the CCWG proposal, and the “group think” clearly evident on your CCWG mail list. I suggest you listen closely to Mathieu Weill. I have been a close observer of your work since the beginning and I trust his judgment and leadership. I have reviewed the ICANN submittal of September 11, 2015, and while it is far from perfect, as best I understand it, a dialogue with the Board may help lead to a path forward. Frankly, the best thing that happened this year, in terms of improving or “enhancing” ICANN accountability, was the dotSUCKS fiasco, because now all of ICANN—stakeholders, directors, officers, staff, contracted parties, and service providers—are now on the radar of the US Federal Trade Commission, and probably the U.S. Justice Department as well. I agree with INTA [International Trademark Association], U.S. jurisdiction should be a fundamental bylaw. The potential for corruption, particularly within the ICANN Global Domains Division, is too great to allow ICANN to try to escape or evade prosecution by relocating to a “friendlier” jurisdiction. The global multi-stakeholder community really doesn’t need more FIFA-like scandals .... ICANN may need Board reform—that should have been priority #1. Almost every failing of ICANN can ultimately be attributed to a Board of Directors that was not activist, failed to question, failed to challenge stakeholders, management, staff or GAC advice, failed to be vigilant, pro-active. Therefore, review and improve processes for selecting members of the ICANN Board of Directors, which will lead to independent, activist, vigilant ICANN directors, reflective of the diversity of the global multi-stakeholder community, who will question, investigate, and push back (when necessary or appropriate) against policies advanced by self-interested ICANN stakeholders which are to the detriment of the global public interest or the global multi-stakeholder community; directors who will question and hold accountable ICANN officers, ICANN staff, GAC advice, and all ICANN stakeholders, including policy-making proposals, inquiring as to whether ICANN policies and principles have been followed ...." (emphasis added in sentence referring to Mathieu Weill)




DISCLAIMER

2015-09-08

IANA Transition Comment Deadline, Domain Mondo Editor Comments

The deadline to submit comments on the IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal is today, September 8, 2015, at 23:59 UTC which is 7:59 PM ET (US). After the conclusion of the public comment period, the ICG will make a final determination about whether to recommend that NTIA approve the transition proposal. More information including Instructions for How to Submit Public Comments is here | https://www.ianacg.org/calls-for-input/combined-proposal-public-comment-period/.

Below are the comments submitted by the Editor of Domain Mondo:

Questions Concerning the Proposal as a Whole
1) Completeness and clarity: Is the combined proposal complete? Each of the operational community proposals contains aspects to be completed in the future when the proposal is implemented. Is the combined proposal specified in sufficient detail such that it can be evaluated against the NTIA criteria?

Numbers: Complete;
Protocol Parameters: Complete;
Names community: INCOMPLETE due to its "dependencies" upon the final work product of WS-1 of CCWG-Accountability, which at this point appears to be unacceptable or inadequate in its present form as contained in the "2nd draft report" published for a comment period ending Sept 12, 2015.

2) Compatibility and interoperability: Do the operational community proposals work together in a single proposal? Do they suggest any incompatible arrangements where compatibility appears to be required? Is the handling of any conflicting overlaps between the functions resolved in a workable manner?

The numbers and protocols proposals work together as a single proposal, with ICANN as the IANA functions operator (IFO). The names proposal is incompatible and inconsistent and results in creating a second IFO (for the "Names community") called PTI, a to-be-created corporation. This is creating unnecessary complexity, incurring unnecessary costs (CWG-Stewardship has reportedly incurred millions of dollars in legal fees, with more to come), and deriving little, if any, net benefit for the names community or the global Internet community. All of this could have been handled internally to ICANN through new bylaws whereby the gTLDs and ccTLDs could comprise a CSC and provisions providing for the selection of a different IFO than ICANN should that need arise. The irony in all of this is that the IANA department within ICANN has always performed its job well as far as I have been able to determine. Certainly numbers and protocols think so. Unfortunately, as the ICG is well aware, CWG-stewardship or “names community” is a dysfunctional group (described by one ICG member, the esteemed Prof. Mueller, as “a collection of warring interests”), who wasted months trying to develop an overly complex "turnkey" proposal referred to as "Contract Co." only to jettison that concept for a "compromise" "hybrid" "solution" now called PTI. This is all indicative of what Nassim Taleb refers to as the "fragilista" who “make you engage in policies and actions, all artificial, in which the benefits are small and visible, and the side effects (are) potentially severe and invisible.” Unfortunately this is also consistent with the tendency of many of ICANN's "names" stakeholders in ICANN policymaking processes to prefer complex dysfunctional solutions over simple functional solutions, in order to increase their "insider" knowledge and status, increase costs, and form barriers to any effective participation by "outsiders" from the global Internet community. Can we (ICANN and the global Internet community) live with this incompatibility and the potential "conflicting overlaps?" As far as the ICG proposal is concerned, I am confident the ICANN Board, management and staff can jury-rig the "workarounds" necessary to "make it work."

3) Accountability: Do the operational community proposals together include appropriate and properly supported independent accountability mechanisms for running the IANA functions? Are there any gaps in overall accountability under the single proposal?

Numbers and Protocols proposals have accountability built-in, consistent with years of experience working with ICANN as IFO. Names proposal? Unknown. CWG-Stewardship claims its new structures' accountability mechanisms will work. Time will tell. See also #6 below.

4) Workability: Do the results of any tests or evaluations of workability that were included in the operational community proposals conflict with each other or raise possible concerns when considered in combination?

I covered this in #2 above.

Questions Concerning NTIA Criteria
5) Do you believe the proposal supports and enhances the multistakeholder model? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

For better or worse, I think the proposal is consistent with the multistakeholder model.

6) Do you believe the proposal maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

No. Read Verisign's 10-Q, July 23, 2015 (p.29): "Under its new gTLD program, ICANN intends to recommend for delegation into the root zone a large number of new gTLDs potentially within a compressed timeframe. On October 23, 2013, NTIA began to authorize, and Verisign began effectuating, the delegation of the new gTLDs. In view of our role as the Root Zone Maintainer, and as a root operator, we face increased risks should ICANN’s delegation of these new gTLDs, which represent unprecedented changes to the root zone in volume and frequency, cause security and stability problems within the DNS and/or for parties who rely on the DNS. Such risks include potential instability of the DNS including potential fragmentation of the DNS should ICANN’s delegations create sufficient instability, and potential claims based on our role in the root zone provisioning and delegation process. These risks, alone or in the aggregate, have the potential to cause serious harm to our Registry Services business. Further, our business could also be harmed through security, stability and resiliency degradation if the delegation of new gTLDs into the root zone causes problems to certain components of the DNS ecosystem or other aspects of the global DNS, or other relying parties are negatively impacted as a result of domain name collisions, such as exposure or other leakage of private or sensitive information. Additionally, DNS Security Extensions (“DNSSEC”) enabled in the root zone and at other levels of the DNS require new preventative maintenance functions and operational practices that did not exist prior to the introduction of DNSSEC. Any failure by Verisign or the IANA functions operator to comply with stated practices, such as those outlined in relevant DNSSEC Practice Statements, introduces risk to DNSSEC relying parties and other Internet users and consumers of the DNS, which could have a material adverse impact on our business." http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/VRSN/368398346x0xS1014473-15-68/1014473/filing.pdf

7) Do you believe the proposal meets the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary. Please indicate if you are a customer or partner of the IANA services.

Yes, unless one or more "customers and partners of the IANA services" state differently during this comment period.

8) Do you believe the proposal maintains the openness of the Internet? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

Yes, subject to the reservations expressed in #1 and #6 above.

9) Do you have any concerns that the proposal is replacing NTIA's role with a government-led or inter-governmental organization solution? If yes, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary. If not, please explain why.

No.

10) Do you believe that the implementation of the proposal will continue to uphold the NTIA criteria in the future? If yes, please explain why. If not, please explain why and what proposal modifications you believe are necessary.

I think all of this is probably just a temporary iteration, necessary in order to end US government "oversight." After this is finished and implemented, I don't think anybody will mention or even consider "NTIA criteria" in the future.

11) Do you believe the ICG report and executive summary accurately reflect all necessary aspects of the overall proposal? If not, please explain what modifications you believe are necessary.

No modifications necessary, provided the provisions for transfer of the IANA trademarks and domain names to the IETF Trust (see numbers proposal) is implemented in a way that ICANN may continue to use the IANA marks and domain names as a licensee so long as it or its controlled entity and affiliate, PTI, performs IANA functions.

General Questions
12) Do you have any general comments for the ICG about the proposal?

ICG should steer clear of the CCWG-Accountability proposal even though the "names proposal" has "dependencies" that might be affected. That CCWG-Accountability process looked like a "rush job" from my close observation, and now the ICANN Board is engaged and proposing changes. I haven't seen any Board specifics, but in any event, that is not within ICG's remit (be thankful). I also agree with the sentiments expressed by Brian Carpenter (Submission ID: 2) in regard to #3 and #6:
  • #3--"I don't see any way that ICANN itself is held accountable for the consequences of its policy decisions (e.g. creating large numbers of unnecessary gTLDs for no discernible motive except money)."
  • #6--"I've been concerned since 1998 that unchecked expansion of the number of gTLDs will eventually take us into uncharted territory from a technical resilience point of view. I see no technical and operational feedback mechanism to protect us against this operational risk in the proposal."
Also, while I do not agree with some of the specifics, I am sympathetic to the frustration expressed in the comments submitted by Parminder Jeet Singh (Submission ID: 19).

-- John Poole, Editor, Domain Mondo

Read other comments submitted here.




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2013-12-02

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